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Abstract 
We study the productivity, financial and distributional performance of the United 
States Postal Service subsequent to its 1971 reorganization. We investigate the 
magnitude and the economic drivers of productivity change (technical change, 
change in cost efficiency, and scale economies), and we investigate the 
distribution of the financial benefits of productivity change (among consumers of 
postal services, postal employees and other resource suppliers, and residual 
claimants). We find improvements in technology to have been the main driver of, 
and diseconomies of scale to have been the main drag on, productivity change. 
We find labor to have been the main beneficiary, and consumers of postal 
services the main losers, from postal reorganization. 
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Productivity at the Post:  its Drivers and its Distribution∗ 
1. Introduction 
We study the productivity, financial and distributional performance of the 
United States Postal Service (USPS) subsequent to its 1971 reorganization from 
the Post Office Department (POD) to an independent government agency. The 
reorganization preserved the monopoly powers originally granted to the POD (the 
“private express statutes”), as well as the universal service at uniform price 
requirement, and so the USPS remains a regulated public monopoly. However its 
operating environment has changed in ways that could not have been foreseen 
nearly four decades ago. The population shift to the south and west has 
stretched its delivery network. Increased competition for overnight and package 
delivery services has eroded its customer base. New technologies such as 
facsimile, electronic mail, the internet and automatic bill payment systems have 
further eroded its customer base. Thus its monopoly powers notwithstanding, the 
USPS has operated in a rapidly changing market environment constrained (or 
protected) by an aging regulatory framework.  
Although its growth has slowed recently, and even reversed in some service 
categories, the USPS remains a very large organization. It incurs nearly $72 
billion in operating expense, roughly 80% of which is compensation and benefits 
for its nearly 800,000 employees. It generates over $72 billion in operating 
revenue, providing postal services to over 146 million delivery points. In light of 
its size and its omnipresence, its productivity performance (which we define as 
total factor productivity), its financial performance (which we define as operating 
profit), and the way it distributes the financial benefits of its productivity change to 
its various stakeholders, are all worthy of investigation.  
These three issues would be of interest for an equally large and 
omnipresent unregulated, privately owned, profit seeking, publicly traded firm. 
With sufficiently strong competition in resource and product markets, one would 
expect the financial benefits of productivity change to be shared by its customers 
and its stockholders, the legally designated residual claimants. In a less 
competitive environment, one might expect a share of the financial benefits of 
productivity change to be captured by labor or other resource suppliers, with 
these additional expenses being passed along to customers in the form of price 
increases. 
However the USPS is a regulated public monopoly, with uncertain economic 
objective(s) and lacking a regulator with any real ability to enforce financial 
discipline. The lack of serious competition from the private sector weakens the 
incentive for strong productivity performance. It also leads to the expectation of 
financial performance that reflects a weak opposition to resource price increases 
that, depending on the economic objective(s) of USPS and on the nature of 
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consumer demand elasticities for postal services, are passed along in the form of 
rate increases. Importantly, this expected financial transfer from consumers to 
resource suppliers is expected to occur independently of the nature of 
productivity performance. Each of these expectations is reinforced by the lack of 
a strong regulator. However the most interesting feature of public ownership is 
the nature of income distribution in the absence of a clearly identifiable residual 
claimant group to reap the financial benefits of productivity change. The absence 
of stockholders as legally designated residual claimants raises the issue of what 
group, if any, constitutes a de facto residual claimant group. Labor is the most, 
perhaps the only, organized resource supplier at USPS, which leads to the 
expectation that the financial transfer goes from consumers primarily to labor 
rather than to all resource suppliers. These features all combine to make the 
relationships among productivity, profit and income distribution particularly 
significant issues at USPS. 
Surprisingly little research has been devoted to the performance of the 
USPS. Much of what is available is concerned with various reform proposals 
aimed at improving its performance. These include the potential for revenue cap 
regulation, the role of the universal service and uniform price obligations, the 
growth of worksharing and competing forms of communication, and the 
prospects for partial or complete privatization. The President’s Commission on 
the United States Postal Service (2003) has recommended reforms that address 
some of these issues, and bills remain pending in Congress as of late 2006. It is 
particularly noteworthy that productivity change, surely an essential component 
of any conception of “performance,” has been largely ignored. The USPS does 
report its productivity performance, in terms of both output per workhour and total 
factor productivity, together with its financial performance, in terms of operating 
profit or loss, in its Annual Reports. In its three most recent Annual Reports the 
USPS claims that its 2003 – 2006 productivity growth “is equivalent to” $2.6 
billion in expense reductions. However neither the economic drivers nor the 
financial consequences, including distributional impacts, of productivity change at 
the USPS have been systematically explored, either in the research community 
or by the USPS itself.1 
We have three objectives. The first is to link productivity trends at the USPS 
with trends in its operating profit performance. The two need not move together, 
and the linkage between the two is forged by the relationship between trends in 
postal rates and input prices, which we refer to as price recovery. We use this 
linkage, and data provided by the USPS, to address the second and third 
objectives. The second objective is to explore the economic drivers of 
productivity change, which can be identified as change in the efficiency of 
resource allocation, improvements in technology, and change in the exploitation 
of scale economies. The third objective is perhaps the most interesting in light of 
the absence of a readily identifiable residual claimant group, and involves an 
investigation of the distribution of the financial benefits of productivity change, 
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which can be associated with consumers of postal services, postal employees 
and other resource suppliers, and the recipients of operating profit or loss. 
Our analytical framework is built around a detailed decomposition of year-to-
year change in operating profit at the USPS. Similar decompositions have been 
described by Davis (1955) as “productivity accounting,” and used by Kendrick 
and Creamer (1961) to analyze productivity, profit and income distribution at a 
number of US companies. Our application to time series data on a single public 
organization is similar to those of Denny et al. (1981), who explore the economic 
drivers (but not the distribution of the financial benefits) of productivity change at 
Bell Canada, and of Lawrence et al. (2006), who explore the distribution of the 
financial benefits (but not the economic drivers) of productivity growth at Telstra, 
Australia’s largest telecommunications firm. In both respects our framework is in 
the spirit of the French tradition as exemplified by Puiseux and Bernard (1965), 
who explore the economic drivers and the distributional impacts of productivity 
change at Electricité de France.  
Our analytical framework differs from those used in the studies just cited. 
We employ superlative indicators of price and quantity change. However an 
exclusive reliance on indicators permits the identification of the sources and 
beneficiaries of productivity change by variable, but identification of the economic 
drivers of productivity change requires economic analysis. We therefore augment 
our superlative indicator approach by exploiting the economic theory of 
production, which enables us to uncover the economic drivers, as well as the 
distributional consequences, of productivity change at the USPS. 
The paper unfolds as follows. Section 2 provides a brief background on 
reorganization and its consequences for productivity and financial performance at 
the USPS. The analytical framework we use to identify the drivers and 
beneficiaries of productivity change is developed in Section 3, where we also 
describe the empirical technique we use to implement the decomposition of 
change in operating profit from one year to the next. Section 4 provides a 
description of the USPS data, an aggregate time series of quantities and prices 
over the period 1963-2004. We describe the results of the empirical analysis in 
Section 5, where we identify the economic drivers and the distributional 
consequences of productivity change. Section 6 concludes with a summary of 
our findings and their implications for postal reform. 
2. Background 
In the 1960s, over a century after it became a Cabinet-level department, the 
POD was in economic and financial trouble. With inadequate capital investment 
and ineffective managerial control in a highly politicized operating environment, it 
was increasingly incapable of distributing growing volumes of mail through an 
expanding network. In addition, it was suffering from financial neglect, with high 
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labor costs and subsidized rates that bore little relation to costs. Annual operating 
losses in excess of a billion current dollars were common.2 
In April 1967 President Johnson appointed a Commission on Postal 
Reorganization. In June 1968 the Commission recommended that the POD be 
reorganized as an independent agency within the executive branch of 
government, one that would be run like a business, financially self-sustaining and 
insulated from political pressure. Following protracted negotiations, the POD was 
transformed into the USPS with the passage of the Postal Reorganization Act 
(PRA), signed by President Nixon in August 1970. The USPS began operations 
July 1, 1971 as an independent agency of the executive branch. 
The PRA transferred operational authority from Congress to an ostensibly 
independent regulator, the Postal Rate Commission (PRC). However the 
authority of the PRC is limited in a number of important ways, with unfortunate 
consequences. 
(a) The PRC cannot set postal rates, but merely recommends rates that can 
be, and have been, overruled by the USPS Board of Governors. Limited 
oversight applies not just to rate increases, but also to cross-subsidy from 
monopolized to competitive service categories. 
(b) The PRA established collective bargaining on wages and working 
conditions, with binding arbitration, and required postal worker wages and 
benefits to be comparable to those prevailing in similar occupations in the 
private sector. However it did not provide the PRC with an enforcement 
mechanism to ensure comparability, and it is widely believed that labor 
costs are higher at the USPS than at comparable occupations in the 
private sector, and that the gap has widened since reorganization. 
(c) The USPS is exempt from SEC disclosure requirements, and the PRC is 
constrained by a lack of subpoena power in its ability to obtain information 
on USPS operations and finances. It is difficult to regulate in the dark. 
(d) The PRA required the USPS to establish a break-even rate structure that 
covers direct and indirect costs attributable to each service category, plus 
a proportion of institutional costs. However the PRC has little influence 
over operating costs, which in turn limits its influence over postal rates. In 
prescient anticipation of future difficulties, the PRA provided for the 
recovery of operating losses through borrowing from the Department of 
Treasury’s Federal Financing Bank, as well as through future rate 
increases. Thus a potential candidate for the title of residual claimant is 
the Federal Financing Bank, which at the end of our study period held 
$1.8 billion of USPS long-term and short-term debt (down from $11.1 
billion two years earlier). However the PRC cannot compel the USPS to 
return annual operating profits to the Bank, and so the Bank’s claims are 
unlikely to be enforceable and its candidacy for residual claimant status is 
not compelling. 
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(e) A natural candidate for the title of ultimate residual claimant to the 
operating profits of a public organization such as the USPS is the 
taxpayers. However their residual claims are neither enforceable nor 
transferable, leaving them with little incentive and no power to hold 
management accountable for the financial performance of the USPS. 
Property rights that are not enforceable and not transferable render 
taxpayers impotent recipients of annual profits or losses, rather than 
legally protected residual claimants. Moreover, since taxpayers are 
consumers of postal services, they become potential double victims of 
USPS financial performance.3 
The PRA did not endow the PRC with sufficient regulatory authority to do its 
job. Against this background, the President’s Commission reform proposals 
address many of the inadequacies mentioned above, although four years on they 
remain proposals. The shortcomings of the current regulatory regime and the 
nature of the reforms proposed by the President’s Commission suggest several 
hypotheses about the productivity, financial and distributional performance of the 
USPS to date. 
Weak PRC influence over labor costs, in conjunction with labor’s strong 
organization and the weak residual claimant rights of other groups, motivates the 
distributional hypothesis that postal employees have been big winners from 
reorganization. The PRA break-even mandate, to the extent that it is honored, 
requires losers as well as winners, and the second distributional hypothesis is 
that weak PRC influence over postal rates has made consumers of postal 
services big losers. The PRA recommendation that the USPS be “run like a 
business,” while not legally binding, nonetheless leads to a third distributional 
hypothesis, that operating losses have diminished subsequent to reorganization. 
However the PRA allowed the USPS access to the Federal Financing Bank, 
which leads to the expectation that operating losses would not be eliminated 
quickly. Whatever the speed, improved financial performance must come from 
somewhere. A hypothesis concerning the economic drivers of improved financial 
performance is that productivity improvements have been the main driving force 
behind improved financial performance. A corollary to the first hypothesis that 
labor has been a big winner asserts that productivity change has been biased, 
and that substitution away from postal employees has occurred, either through 
improved cost efficiency or through the adoption of new technologies, particularly 
of the labor saving kind. We explore each of these hypotheses in Section 5. 
Productivity has improved since reorganization, although growth rates 
remain relatively low. Figure 1 tracks the USPS calculation of its cumulative total 
factor productivity over the period 1963-2004. The annual growth rate has 
trended upward, improving from 0.04% before reorganization to 0.5% since. 
USPS productivity was barely 17% higher in 2004 than it was at reorganization in 
1972. To put these figures in perspective, in its Annual Reports the USPS 
benchmarks its productivity performance against that of the US private non-farm 
Grifell – Tatjé, E. and C.A.K. Lovell (2008), “Productivity at the Post: its Drivers and its 
Distribution,” Journal of Regulatory Economics vol.33, issue 2, April, pp 133 – 158. 
DOI: 10.1007/s11149-007-9051-y 
 6
business sector, as reported by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. The BLS (2007) 
reports annual growth rates of multifactor productivity of 1.0% over the period 
1963-2004, slowing from 1.7% over the pre-reorganization period to 0.8% over 
the post-reorganization period. Productivity in the non-farm business sector was 
29% higher in 2004 than it was in 1972. Although much of the divergence 
occurred prior to reorganization, since 1972 productivity growth at the USPS has 
remained barely half as fast as in the private non-farm business sector. 
Insert Figure 1 about here. 
These modest but accelerating rates of productivity growth have contributed 
to a substantial improvement in the bottom line. Table 2 tracks annual operating 
profit, in current dollars, over the 1963-2004 period. Mean annual operating 
losses mounted through 1976, bottoming out at $2.6 billion. Losses then 
diminished through 1991 and turned to operating profit through most of the 
period since 1992. Although productivity growth has contributed to the 
remarkable turnaround in the financial performance of the USPS, it is clear from 
Figures 1 and 2 that there must be more to the story. Trends in resource prices 
and postal rates have played an important role as well, as our analysis will 
demonstrate. 
Insert Figure 2 about here. 
3. The Analytical Framework 
Testing the hypotheses developed in Section 2 requires an analytical 
framework, which we develop in Sections 3.1 and 3.2, and an estimation 
procedure, which we develop in Section 3.3. The analytical framework is an 
extension of that developed by Grifell-Tatjé and Lovell (1999), and revolves 
around change in operating profit from one fiscal year to the next. This does not 
imply that we assign to USPS the economic objective of profit maximization. We 
have noted the “uncertain economic objective(s)” of USPS, and we have 
emphasized the lack of credible residual claimants to impose an economic 
objective on USPS. We remain agnostic concerning what motivates managerial 
decision-making at USPS. We use operating profit as a metric because of the 
prominence accorded it in USPS annual reports, because it provides a valid 
indicator of financial performance, of the financial consequences of the pursuit of 
whatever economic objective the USPS does pursue, and because it provides a 
convenient analytical framework for quantifying the economic drivers and the 
financial and distributional consequences of productivity change at USPS.4 
3.1 Decomposing Change in Operating Profit 
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We begin with an expression for operating profit in period t, 
pit = Rt – Ct = ptyt – Σnwntxnt,                                                         (1) 
where pi is operating profit, R is revenue, C is cost, p is the price of output y and 
wn is the price of input xn, n=1,…,N.5 
Operating profit changes through time because quantities change and 
because prices change. We decompose the change in operating profit between 
periods t and t+1 (pit+1 - pit) into an aggregate quantity effect and an aggregate 
price effect. We avoid having to choose between base period and comparison 
period weights by using arithmetic mean price weights ( p and w n) and arithmetic 
mean quantity weights ( y and x n) to generate 
pit+1 - pit = [ p (yt+1 - yt) – Σ w n(xnt+1 - xnt)] + [( y (pt+1 - pt) – Σ x n(wnt+1 - wnt)],       (2) 
which decomposes profit change into the contributions of changes in individual 
quantities, holding prices fixed at arithmetic mean values, and changes in 
individual prices, holding quantities fixed at arithmetic mean values. Because 
profit change is expressed in value terms, so is each component. 
The first term on the right side of (2) is an aggregate quantity effect that 
shows the contribution of (1+N) individual quantity changes to profit change, 
holding (1+N) prices fixed at their arithmetic mean values p  = (½)(pt + pt+1) and 
w n = (½)(wnt + wnt+1). The (1+N) components of the aggregate quantity effect are 
Bennet (1920) quantity indicators. The second term on the right side is an 
aggregate price effect that shows the contribution of (1+N) individual price 
changes to profit change, holding (1+N) quantities fixed at their arithmetic mean 
values y  = (½)(yt + yt+1) and x n = (½)(xnt + xnt+1). The (1+N) components of the 
aggregate price effect are Bennet price indicators. While the more familiar 
quantity and price indexes express changes as pure numbers in ratio form, 
quantity and price indicators express changes in monetary units in difference 
form.6 
Expression (2) identifies the individual prices and quantities responsible for 
profit change. It is also useful to identify the beneficiaries of the fruits of 
productivity change. This can be accomplished by rearranging (2) to obtain 
[ p (yt+1 - yt) – Σ w n(xnt+1 - xnt)] = (pit+1 - pit)  – y (pt+1 - pt) + Σ x n(wnt+1 - wnt).      (3) 
The left side is the aggregate quantity effect from (2). The right side 
quantifies the gains or losses of the individual recipients of the benefits of the 
quantity effect. The recipients include members of whatever group to which the 
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change in operating profit (pit+1 - pit) is allocated, consumers of postal services 
who pay the change in output price, with pt+1 < pt ⇒ - y (pt+1 - pt) > 0, and 
individual resource suppliers who receive the changes in individual resource 
prices, with wnt+1 > wnt ⇒ x n(wnt+1 - wnt) > 0, n=1,…,N. 
3.2 Decomposing the Quantity Effect 
The right side of (3) identifies the recipients of the benefits of the quantity 
effect, and quantifies their receipts. The left side, the quantity effect itself, 
identifies the agents responsible for the quantity effect, and quantifies their 
contributions. Both decompositions are based on observed data and superlative 
indicators. Together they constitute what Davis (1955) called productivity 
accounting. However decomposing the quantity effect into its economic drivers, 
as distinct from its responsible agents, requires economic analysis. 
Tt and Tt+1 in Figure 3 are sets of feasible production activities in periods t 
and t+1, and Lt(yt), Lt+1(yt) and Lt+1(yt+1) in Figure 4 are input sets corresponding 
to Tt and Tt+1. In Figure 3 Tt ⊂ Tt+1 on the assumption that technical progress has 
occurred. The same assumption generates Lt(yt) ⊂ Lt+1(yt) in Figure 4, in which 
Lt+1(yt+1) ⊂ Lt+1(yt) on the assumption that yt+1 > yt. In both Figures the objective is 
to decompose the change from (xt,yt) to (xt+1,yt+1), which when weighted by 
arithmetic mean prices is the quantity effect on the left side of (3). 
In both Figures xCEt and xCEt+1 are cost-efficient input vectors for (yt,wt,Tt) 
and (yt+1,wt+1,Tt+1) respectively, that purge xt and xt+1 of cost inefficiency in 
resource use. In addition, improvements in technology between periods t and t+1 
enable cost-efficient input vector xCEt to be displaced by input vector xE, which is 
cost-efficient for (yt,wt,Tt+1). The three cost minimizing input vectors xCEt, xCEt+1 
and xE are unobserved. Identifying them enables us to identify the contributions 
to the quantity effect of a change in cost efficiency, by comparing (xt+1 - xCEt+1) 
with (xt - xCEt); an improvement in technology, represented by (xCEt - xE); and the 
exploitation of scale economies reflected in a movement along the surface of Tt+1 
from (yt,xE) to (yt+1,xCEt+1). These three sources comprise a productivity effect, 
which is one component of the aggregate quantity effect on the left side of (3). 
Insert Figure 3 about here. 
Insert Figure 4 about here. 
The quantity effect is often equated with a productivity effect. However this 
is not necessarily the case, since the quantity effect has a margin component as 
well as a productivity component, as evidenced by the decomposition 
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p (yt+1 - yt) – Σ w n(xnt+1 - xnt)                                             quantity effect 
= [ p  - (Σ w nxnCEt)/yt](yt+1 - yt)                            margin effect 
+ (Σ w nxnCEt/yt)(yt+1 - yt) – Σ w n(xnt+1 - xnt)   productivity effect   (4) 
The quantity effect collapses to a productivity effect only if the margin effect 
is zero. For nonzero output change the margin effect is zero if the margin [ p  - 
(Σ w nxnCEt)/yt] = 0. The margin effect expresses the simple idea that expansion 
with a positive margin is profitable, quite independently of any improvement in 
productivity. The margin effect is expressed in value terms, and weights output 
change by the margin between arithmetic mean output price and cost-efficient 
average cost evaluated at arithmetic mean input prices. Expansion with a 
positive cost-efficient margin [ p  - (Σ w nxnCEt)/yt > 0] contributes positively to the 
quantity effect, and hence to profit change. Conversely, a negative cost-efficient 
margin signals that arithmetic mean output price is insufficient to cover cost-
efficient average cost, much less actual average cost, and contraction would 
reduce losses. We show below that the post-reorganization performance of the 
USPS illustrates both possibilities.7 
The productivity effect also is expressed in value terms, as the difference 
between weighted output change and weighted input change. The weight on 
output change is cost-efficient average cost. The productivity effect decomposes 
as  
Σ w n(xnCEt/yt)(yt+1 - yt) – Σ w n(xnt+1 - xnt)                     productivity effect 
= [Σ w n(xnt - xnCEt) – Σ w n(xnt+1 - xnCEt+1)]  cost efficiency effect 
+ [Σ w n(xnCEt - xnE)]                               technical change effect 
+ Σ w n(xnCEt/yt)(yt+1 - yt) - Σ w n(xnCEt+1 - xnE)            scale effect  (5) 
The cost efficiency effect captures the contribution to the productivity effect 
of a change in the cost efficiency of resource allocation between periods t and 
t+1, by comparing the value of (xt+1 - xCEt+1) with that of (xt - xCEt), using arithmetic 
mean input price weights. A positive cost efficiency effect measures the financial 
benefits of an improvement in cost efficiency, which contributes positively to the 
productivity effect and enhances profit change. 
The technical change effect captures the contribution to productivity change 
of an improvement in technology between periods t and t+1, evaluated with an 
input-saving orientation at yt, by comparing the cost of xCEt on the surface of Tt 
with that of xE on the surface of Tt+1, again using arithmetic mean input price 
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weights. A positive technical change effect measures the financial benefits of 
cost-saving technical progress, which contributes positively to the productivity 
effect and enhances profit change. As Figure 4 indicates, technical change can 
be biased. 
The scale effect corresponds to a movement along the surface of Tt+1 from 
(yt,xE) to (yt+1,xCEt+1), and captures the contribution of scale economies to the 
productivity effect. A positive scale effect reflects either expansion in the 
presence of increasing returns to scale, or contraction in the presence of 
decreasing returns to scale, either of which contributes positively to the quantity 
effect and enhances profit change.8,9 
3.3 Implementing the Decomposition of the Quantity Effect 
In decompositions (4) and (5) the output quantity y and the input quantity 
vector x are observed, as is the input price vector w. However the cost-efficient 
input quantity vectors xCE and xE are not observed, and as Figures 3 and 4 
suggest they must be retrieved from observed data and the technologies. 
However because the technologies are unobserved as well, we use a sequential 
form of data envelopment analysis (DEA) to approximate them. This enables us 
to solve for the cost-efficient input quantity vectors xCE and xE.  
Since xCEt is a cost minimizing input vector for (yt,wt,Tt), it can be identified 
as the solution to the linear program 
minx {wtTx : x ≧ Xtλ, Ytλ ≧ yt, λ ≧ 0, ∑λ= 1}.                                              (6) 
In this program the objective is to find an input quantity vector x that 
minimizes expenditure wtTx = ∑wntxnt required to produce yt, provided that (x,yt) is 
feasible with Tt. The data matrices Yt and Xt contain all outputs and inputs 
observed in periods {1,…,t}. Thus feasibility of (x,yt) requires that (x,yt) belong to 
the production set TtDEA = {(x,yt) : x ≧ Xtλ, Ytλ ≧ yt, λ ≧ 0, ∑λ= 1}. TtDEA is the DEA 
approximation to the unobserved production set Tt. TtDEA is constructed 
sequentially, on the assumption that activities adopted in previous years are 
remembered and remain available for adoption in subsequent years; this 
assumption rules out technical regress. The convexity constraint {λ ≧ 0, ∑λ = 1} 
allows the surface of TtDEA to satisfy variable returns to scale. The solution to this 
program is the cost-efficient input quantity vector xCEt in Figures 3 and 4 and in 
decompositions (4) and (5). 
Since xE is the solution to the same cost minimizing problem, but using 
technology Tt+1, solving for xE requires expanding the data matrices to Xt+1 and 
Yt+1 and retaining wt and yt. The solution to this program is the cost-efficient input 
quantity vector xE in Figures 3 and 4 and in decompositions (4) and (5). 
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Once the annual cost-efficient input quantity vectors xCE and xE are 
calculated, they are inserted into decomposition (4) to quantify the margin effect 
and the productivity effect. The sources of productivity change are quantified on 
the right side of (5), and the beneficiaries of productivity change are quantified on 
the right side of (3). The input quantity vectors are identified using observed input 
prices, and their effects are quantified using arithmetic mean input prices. 
4. Data 
Our database is a 1963-2004 time series. Although we utilize the entire time 
series in sequential DEA to construct annual technologies, we restrict our 
empirical analysis to the post-reorganization period 1972-2004. Thus in our 
empirical analysis t=1 corresponds to the year 1972, with 1972 technology T1DEA 
constructed sequentially from 1963-1972 data, t=2 corresponds to the year 1973, 
with 1973 technology T2DEA constructed sequentially from 1963-1973 data, and 
so on. This enables us to focus on the performance of the USPS, and not that of 
its predecessor POD.10 
We divide the post-reorganization period into three decades and a terminal 
era, inspired by trends in operating profit depicted in Figure 2. The first, 1972-
1982, plumbs the financial depths. The second, 1982-1992, tracks shrinking 
losses that turned to the first year of operating profit in 1992. The third, 1992-
2001, was a generally profitable decade. The terminal era, 2001-2004, begins 
with the general business slowdown following the 9/11/01 terrorist attacks and 
the anthrax attacks at post offices, and it also marks the beginning of the term of 
the current Postmaster General. 
With one exception, all variables are contained in an internal database the 
USPS has provided to us. The exception is operating revenue R, which is 
obtained from USPS annual reports. Operating revenue is expressed in current 
dollars, and excludes the general public service subsidy and the foregone 
revenue appropriation because neither reflects revenue from operations. The two 
excluded items have declined from 18% of total revenue in 1972 to 0.05% of total 
revenue in 2004. 
Operating cost C is the sum of expenditures on capital, labor and materials 
inputs, and also is expressed in current dollars. The operating profit series is 
defined as pi = R - C and is depicted in Figure 2.11 
The output quantity index y is a convex combination of a mail quantity index 
and a delivery network index, the former incorporating seven mail categories and 
four miscellaneous services and the latter combining urban and rural delivery 
points. An output price index is defined as p = R/y and set to unity in 1972, with 
the output quantity index expressed in 1972 dollars. 
Quantity and price indexes for capital, labor and materials are defined in the 
same way, with input price indexes set to unity in 1972 and input quantity 
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indexes expressed in 1972 dollars. These indexes incorporate seven, 12 and 29 
categories, respectively. 
The data are summarized, by sub-period, in Table 1. Certain trends are 
clear, although sub-period means and growth rates conceal considerable year-to-
year variability in some variables. With this in mind, mean operating losses 
increased by 7.8% annually prior to reorganization, and declined by 10% 
annually thereafter. The impressive post-reorganization improvement in financial 
performance is clear from Table 1, as are the trends in individual quantities and 
prices. However the contributions of these trends to improved financial 
performance require indicators and analysis. In the next Section we use the 
analytical framework and estimation procedure developed in Section 3 to quantify 
the economic drivers and the individual beneficiaries of productivity change at 
USPS. 
5. Results 
Tables 2 – 4 are based on price and quantity indicators developed in 
Section 3.1, and convert price and quantity trends summarized in Table 1 into 
monetary contributions of price and quantity changes to profit change at USPS. 
Table 5 is based on the analytical framework developed in Section 3.2, and 
quantifies the economic drivers of productivity change at USPS. Like Table 1, 
Tables 2 – 5 report changes averaged over sub-periods, and these average 
changes conceal considerable variability in year-to-year changes for some 
indicators. 12 
Table 2 is organized around decomposition (2), which allocates profit 
change to price change and quantity change. Over the entire post-reorganization 
period operating profit increased by nearly $120 million annually, despite 
unfavorable price trends that deteriorated from small positive contributions in the 
first two sub-periods to large negative contributions thereafter, and exerted a 
drag on operating profit of nearly $100 million annually. Both trends magnified 
after 2001. Operating profit in that subperiod increased by nearly $900 million 
annually, despite a continuing deterioration in the price structure that drained 
$265 million annually. We explore the very large favorable quantity effect in 
Table 3. 
Table 3 also is organized around decomposition (2), and quantifies the 
contribution of each variable to quantity change. For the subperiod prior to 2001, 
the mean value of output growth exceeded the value of input growth (obtained by 
adding the capital, labor and materials quantity effects), generating, on average, 
a positive and growing contribution of the quantity effect to profit change. The 
situation changed dramatically after 2001. In that subperiod, the positive quantity 
effect magnified, contributing over $1.1 billion annually to profit change, despite 
an unprecedented mean decline in output that drained more than $250 million 
annually from the quantity effect. A positive quantity effect in the presence of a 
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negative output quantity effect requires a larger negative input quantity effect. 
Most of the negative input quantity effect can be traced to labor shedding, which 
contributed nearly $1.4 billion annually to the quantity effect, and to a reduction in 
complementary materials use that saved a lesser amount. We explore labor 
shedding further in Table 5. 
It is noteworthy that expansion contributed positively to profit change prior to 
2001, and contraction also contributed positively to profit change subsequently. 
Output contraction was largely exogenous, brought on by economic stagnation 
following the events of 2001, and by consumer substitution into alternative forms 
of communication. However the input contraction that made this output 
contraction profitable was endogenous and not guaranteed, and required good 
management. We refer to this period as one of “managing decline,” largely 
through reductions in the USPS workforce.  
Table 4 is organized around decomposition (3), and provides an alternative 
decomposition of the quantity effect, in an effort to quantify the financial gains of 
the winners and the financial losses of the losers since reorganization. 
Throughout the entire post-reorganization period two groups, postal employees 
and consumers of postal services, dominated the positive and growing quantity 
effect. Suppliers of materials and, to a lesser extent, suppliers of capital services 
were modest nominal gainers, with gains of the latter depressed by low interest 
rates beginning in the 1990s. The Federal Financing Bank and taxpayers were 
also modest gainers (if $120 million annually can be called modest), in the sense 
that annual operating losses declined and finally turned to operating profit, some 
of which was returned to the Bank. However all of these gains were dominated, 
on average by one and two orders of magnitude, by the gains of postal 
employees, whose rising compensation drained over $1.3 billion annually from 
USPS operating profit. These gains were funded by the only losers since postal 
reorganization, postal customers. Since reorganization the USPS has transferred 
over $1.3 billion annually from its customers to its employees. These findings 
confirm and quantify the distributional hypotheses put forth in Section 2. However 
unlike the dramatic changes beginning in 2001 noted in Tables 2 and 3, this 
redistribution process was impervious to change. The average losses incurred by 
suppliers of capital services expanded, as did the gains accruing to the Federal 
Financing Bank and taxpayers, but the transfer of over $1.3 billion annually from 
postal customers to postal employees continued despite the downturn. Managing 
decline did not involve managing employee compensation or postal rates.  
Table 5 provides an alternative decomposition of the quantity effect, built 
around decompositions (4) and (5), both of which augment raw data with 
economic analysis. The first objective is to quantify the contribution of 
productivity change to quantity change, and hence to profit change. This is 
accomplished in the first three columns, which implement decomposition (4) by 
decomposing the quantity effect into margin and productivity effects. Throughout 
the post-reorganization period the margin effect has been negative on average 
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and relatively small, suggesting that postal rates have not quite managed to 
cover cost-efficient average cost. It follows that postal rates have not covered 
actual average cost, and this explains why operating profit has been negative on 
average, although the upward trend in the margin effect is consistent with the 
upward trend in operating profit depicted in Figure 2. However in this exercise the 
USPS establishes its own best practice technology, so the benchmark “cost-
efficient average cost” should be interpreted accordingly. 
Throughout the post-reorganization period, the productivity effect has, on 
average, dominated the margin effect by two orders of magnitude. The 
productivity effect has delivered mean cost savings of $224 million annually, and 
its contribution has increased through successive sub-periods. Since 2001 
productivity gains have reduced operating expenses by over $1 billion annually. 
This finding confirms and quantifies the hypothesis that productivity growth has 
been the primary source of improvement in financial performance at USPS.13  
The productivity effect in Table 5 is cumulated over time in Figure 5. A 
comparison of the cumulative productivity effect in Figure 5 with the USPS 
cumulative total factor productivity index in Figure 1 reveals that the two follow 
precisely the same pattern throughout the post-reorganization period, with peaks 
and troughs in the same years. The only difference between the two Figures is 
the vertical axis, with productivity gains reported in Figure 1 as a cumulative 
index number and in Figure 5 as a cumulative contribution to the bottom line. We 
have made no use of the USPS total factor productivity series in our analysis, 
and we have obtained a productivity effect that behaves in exactly the same way.  
Insert Figure 5 about here. 
The second objective of Table 5 is to quantify the contributions of the 
economic drivers of productivity change to profit change. This is accomplished in 
the final three columns, which implement decomposition (5). 
The cost efficiency of resource allocation has not improved since 
reorganization, and has made virtually no contribution to productivity change, and 
hence to profit change. Again recalling that the USPS establishes its own best 
practice standards, it is not possible to discern whether this is due to persistent 
cost efficiency or to persistent resource misallocation. This finding contradicts the 
hypothesis of improvements in cost efficiency. It is, however, a predictable 
consequence of the limited ability of the PRC to regulate postal rates, which in 
turn offers the USPS little incentive to control operating costs. It is also consistent 
with political and labor opposition to streamlining the delivery network and to the 
introduction of new mail sorting technologies.  
The primary driver of productivity change has been improvements in 
technology, which have delivered cost savings of nearly $350 million annually, 
and the average value of these savings has increased through successive sub-
Grifell – Tatjé, E. and C.A.K. Lovell (2008), “Productivity at the Post: its Drivers and its 
Distribution,” Journal of Regulatory Economics vol.33, issue 2, April, pp 133 – 158. 
DOI: 10.1007/s11149-007-9051-y 
 15
periods. Technical progress has taken (at least) two forms, although it is not 
possible to disentangle their separate impacts. One is continuing improvements 
in mail sorting and delivery technologies, and the other is worksharing. The 
introduction of new technologies is well documented by the USPS (2003) and in 
its annual reports, and Cohen et al. (2004b) explore the impacts of worksharing. 
It is possible to verify that technical progress has been strongly biased in a labor-
saving direction. The ratio (xLE/xKE) declined by 68% and the ratio (xLE/xME) 
declined by 50% since reorganization, and the former trend accelerated after 
2001. One of the reasons managing decline was profitable is that it involved 
labor shedding. The findings that technical progress has been the main driver of 
productivity change, and that it has been biased in a labor-saving direction, 
confirm and quantify the hypotheses developed in Section 2. 
The scale effect acted, on average, as a drag on productivity growth prior to 
2001. The large mean negative scale effect is a signal that the value of output 
growth was smaller than the value of input growth, controlling for change in cost 
efficiency and improvements in technology. The negative scale effect attaches 
monetary value to the consequence of expansion in the presence of decreasing 
returns to scale. The implied magnitude of returns to scale is actually very close 
to zero, with a 1972 - 2001 mean value of –0.005 (and standard deviation of 
0.011), and exhibits no trend whatsoever. Nonetheless expansion prior to 2001 in 
the presence of very slight decreasing returns to scale generated a large 
negative scale effect that depressed the financial benefits of productivity growth, 
and hence depressed profit change. Once again, however, the situation changed 
after 2001, when contraction in the presence of mildly decreasing returns to scale 
generated a large positive scale effect that enhanced productivity change and 
hence profit change.14 One of the reasons managing decline was profitable is 
that it exploited the structure of technology. This finding is unexpected. 
Table 5 quantifies the financial contributions of the drivers of productivity 
change. A central message is that, in a large organization, small rates of change 
convert to large monetary values. This is especially true for the technical change 
and scale effects. Prior to 2001, productivity growth averaged 0.5% annually, the 
result of a slightly faster rate of technical progress partly offset by expansion in 
the presence of slightly decreasing returns to scale. These small rates of change 
contributed approximately $135 million in annual operating cost savings. 
Subsequent to 2001 productivity growth increased to 1.7% annually, the result of 
a slightly slower rate of technical progress augmented by contraction in the 
presence of slightly decreasing returns to scale. These larger rates of change 
contributed over $1.1 billion in annual operating cost savings. Figure 5 shows 
that productivity growth has contributed over $7 billion to the bottom line since 
reorganization, most of it since 1999. This lends support to the USPS (2004) 
claim of $6.1 billion in productivity-related cost savings during the last five years. 
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6. Conclusions 
The Postal Reorganization Act of 1970 sought to make the USPS a self-
sustaining public corporation. The USPS has made impressive financial gains, 
but more than three decades after reorganization it remains in debt to the 
Federal Financing Bank. In this paper we have explored the sources and the 
beneficiaries of year-to-year change in operating profit at the USPS. We have 
exploited an internal database provided by the USPS to conduct our exploration. 
Identification of the sources and beneficiaries by variable requires only the 
conversion of these data to price and quantity indicators, but identification of the 
economic drivers of change in operating profit requires economic analysis. 
At the initial stage of our exploration, we find poor price recovery 
performance to have exerted an increasingly heavy drag on financial 
performance, particularly in the two most recent sub-periods. The inability to 
compensate for the cost of input price increases with revenue-enhancing postal 
rate increases has reduced operating profit by nearly $100 million annually since 
reorganization, and by $365 million annually since 1992. This poor price recovery 
may reflect an inability of the USPS to contain costs by bargaining effectively with 
its input suppliers, particularly labor, whose price effect has dominated the input 
price effect throughout the period. This may also reflect an inability of the USPS 
to enhance revenue by persuading its regulator to grant postal rate increases 
adequate to cover increases in its inflated operating cost in a timely manner. In 
light of the weakness of the Postal Rate Commission, and the availability of the 
Federal Financing Bank, the first explanation seems more likely than the second. 
The dual inability to contain cost and enhance revenue leads to an 
identification of the primary winners and losers from reorganization. Although 
price recovery was negative, output price increases were sufficient to generate a 
large positive output price effect throughout the period, making consumers of 
postal services consistently large losers. The magnitude of their losses exhibits 
no trend through the period, averaging a staggering $1.4 billion annually since 
reorganization. However even an output price effect of this magnitude was nearly 
offset by the labor price effect alone, making postal employees consistently large 
winners. The magnitude of labor’s gains also exhibits no trend through the 
period, and averages a slightly less staggering $1.3 billion annually. It is 
noteworthy that, despite all the changes involving USPS, its regulator, and its 
operating environment, this financial transfer has persisted for over three 
decades. 
At the second stage of our exploration we apply economic analysis to the 
database in order to derive an independent measure of productivity change at 
the USPS and to identify its drivers. This requires decomposing a favorable 
quantity effect into a margin effect and a productivity effect. We find a small but 
improving margin effect, suggesting that rates determined by the PRC in the first 
two sub-periods were insufficient to cover ostensibly efficient unit operating cost, 
much less actual unit operating cost. However in the final two sub-periods rates 
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have been sufficient to cover ostensibly efficient unit operating cost and, in light 
of positive operating profit in most years since 1992, actual unit operating cost as 
well. 
We also find productivity gains to have been modest but positive and 
growing through sub-periods, delivering cost savings that have grown from less 
than $100 million annually in the first two sub-periods to over $1.1 billion annually 
since 2001. Productivity growth has been the primary source of increases in the 
quantity effect. Productivity gains have not, however, come from improvements in 
cost efficiency, even as defined by the USPS best practice standards. This 
finding reinforces a previous finding (Geddes, 1998), who used the same 
measure of productivity but a different measure of cost efficiency. Productivity 
gains have come exclusively from improvements in sorting and delivery 
technologies that have involved substitution of capital and materials for labor, 
and from worksharing that has involved substitution of outside labor for USPS 
labor. Indeed prior to 2001 the financial benefits of technical change exceeded 
those of productivity growth, of which it is one of three components. This came 
about because the productivity gains associated with technical progress were 
partly offset by the deleterious consequences of expansion in the presence of 
mildly decreasing returns to scale. This pattern is consistent with the “growth 
without regard for cost” hypothesis (Sappington & Sidak, 2003). 
We offered no hypothesis concerning the post-2001 performance of USPS, 
during which profits increased, despite a continuing poor price recovery 
performance and despite an unprecedented decline in mail volume. An 
unexpected but potentially significant finding is that the decline in mail volume 
has been financially beneficial. The explanation revolves around our finding of 
slight decreasing returns to scale at USPS. Prior to 2001, when output was 
growing, an unfavorable scale effect partially offset the favorable technical 
change effect and exerted a drag on productivity growth. Subsequently, when 
output was declining, the scale effect turned favorable and reinforced the 
technical change effect. However output decline in the presence of decreasing 
returns to scale is financially beneficial only if input use is flexible downward, and 
labor and materials quantity indicators declined by 2.0% and 0.7% annually after 
2001. The era of managing decline has been achieved almost exclusively 
through an equally unprecedented labor shedding. 
Our findings have bearing on recent reform proposals of the President’s 
Commission on the United States Postal Service (2003). Deploring the 
“inefficiency of its operations and legacy network” and the resulting “billions of 
dollars in unnecessary costs that should be eliminated rather than passed on to 
ratepayers,” the Commission suggests that the USPS “needs a new business 
model.”  
Foremost among the Commission’s recommendations is the establishment 
of a truly independent Postal Regulatory Board having broader powers than 
those enjoyed by the current PRC. The Board would be responsible for setting 
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postal rate ceilings that rise by less than the rate of inflation, a sort of revenue 
cap regime. Rate ceilings would in turn motivate downward pressure on 
employee compensation. This recommendation is consistent with our 
identification of the price effect as the source of losses at USPS, and also with 
our identification of employees and consumers as the beneficiaries and victims of 
lax regulation since reorganization. The post-2001 era of managing decline is 
consistent with the Commission’s belief that the USPS can “grow smaller and 
stronger.” If these quantity effects can be sustained, then they would reinforce 
the price effects recommended by the Commission.  
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Figure 1.  Total Factor Productivity Growth at the USPS 
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Figure 2.  Annual Operating Profit at the USPS 
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Figure 3.  Decomposition of the Productivity Effect I 
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Figure 5. Cumulative Productivity Effect at the USPS 
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Table 1. Summary Statistics for United States Postal Service, 
1963 – 2004 
  
1963 - 
1972 
1972 - 
1982 
1982 - 
1992 
1992 - 
2001 
2001 - 
2004 
1972 - 
2004 
Mean Operating Profit (current $) -1,308 -1,918 -799 638 1,176 -548 
Growth Rate -7.8% 13.0% a a a a 
              
Mean Operating Revenues (current $) 5,473 13,506 32,959 56,434 67,410 36,684 
Growth Rate 8.0% 9.6% 6.5% 3.5% 1.2% 7.2% 
              
Y   Mean Workload (1972 $) 7,362 8,019 9,496 11,495 12,165 9,861 
Growth Rate 2.0% 0.3% 2.2% 1.7% -0.3% 1.5% 
             
p   Mean Output Price (1972 = 1.0) 0.737 1.679 3.430 4.892 5.542 3.477 
Growth Rate 6.0% 9.3% 4.2% 1.8% 1.5% 5.8% 
              
Mean Cost (current $) 6,781 15,424 33,758 55,797 66,234 37,232 
Growth Rate 8.0% 7.9% 6.3% 3.7% 0.2% 6.4% 
              
K  Mean Capital Quantity (1972 $) 238 394 543 941 1,307 684 
Growth Rate 7.2% 1.9% 5.1% 5.5% 1.7% 4.6% 
              
wk Mean Capital Price (1972 = 1.0) 0.855 1.509 3.132 3.577 3.169 2.713 
Growth Rate 3.0% 9.6% 2.0% -0.3% -3.9% 3.6% 
              
L  Mean Labor Quantity (1972 $) 7,601 7,846 8,815 9,595 9,300 8,776 
Growth Rate 1.9% -0.2% 1.5% 0.5% -2.0% 0.4% 
              
wL  Mean Labor Price (1972 = 1.0) 0.707 1.636 3.073 4.551 5.519 3.265 
Growth Rate 6.9% 7.8% 4.8% 2.7% 2.4% 5.9% 
              
M  Mean Materials Quantity (1972 $) 1,367 1,311 1,809 2,771 3,009 2,043 
Growth Rate 0.5% 0.7% 3.9% 3.3% -0.7% 2.7% 
              
wM Mean Materials Price (1972 = 1.0) 0.831 1.520 2.583 3.117 3.598 2.483 
Growth Rate 3.2% 7.8% 1.8% 2.1% 1.1% 4.4% 
(a) Changes in sign       
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Table 2. Operating Profit Change Decomposition  
Mean Results by Period  (millions of current dollars) 
Period   Operating Profit Change = Bennet Price Indicator + Bennet Quantity Indicator 
1972 - 1982 
Mean 136.6 
  
109.1 
  
27.5 
Std. Dev. 765.0 
  
827.8 
  
271.5 
1982 - 1992 
Mean 74.1 
  
10.5 
  
63.6 
Std. Dev. 824.0 
  
1,055.7 
  
496.3 
1992 - 2001 
Mean -102.0 
  
-398.4 
  
296.4 
Std. Dev. 1,067.8 
  
1,797.7 
  
997.8 
2001 - 2004 
Mean 879.7 
  
-265.4 
  
1,145.1 
Std. Dev. 2,418.6 
  
2,645.5 
  
486.7 
1972 - 2004 
Mean 119.6 
  
-99.5 
  
219.2 
Std. Dev. 1,053.4 
  
1,361.8 
  
685.2 
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Table 3. Bennet Quantity Indicator Primal Decomposition  
Mean Results by Period (millions of current dollars) 
Period   
Bennet 
Quantity 
Indicator 
= Output Quantity - Capital Quantity - Labor Quantity - Material Quantity 
1972 - 1982 
Mean 27.5 
  
38.6 
  
8.3 
  
-20.6 
  
23.4 
Std. Dev. 271.5 
  
205.3 
  
24.1 
  
185.6 
  
96.2 
1982 - 1992 
Mean 63.6 
  
730.9 
  
97.3 
  
372.2 
  
197.8 
Std. Dev. 496.3 
  
461.7 
  
41.1 
  
411.0 
  
166.6 
1992 - 2001 
Mean 296.4 
  
1,035.5 
  
207.5 
  
246.4 
  
285.3 
Std. Dev. 997.8 
  
615.7 
  
67.9 
  
765.9 
  
545.7 
2001 - 2004 
Mean 1,145.1 
  
-252.7 
  
96.6 
  
-1,387.7 
  
-106.8 
Std. Dev. 486.7   1,103.1   126.4   747.7   45.0 
1972 - 2004 
Mean 219.2 
  
508.0 
  
100.4 
  
49.1 
  
139.3 
Std. Dev. 685.2 
  
688.7 
  
94.6 
  
702.0 
  
324.4 
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Table 4.  Bennet Quantity Indicator Dual Decomposition 
        
Mean Results by Period (millions of current dollars) 
    
     
Period   
Bennet  
Quantity 
Indicator 
= Profit Change - Output Price + Capital Price + Labor Price + Material Price 
1972 - 1982 
Mean 27.5   136.6   1,433.0 
  
76.7 
  
1,068.4 
  
178.8 
Std. Dev. 271.5   765.0   975.2   83.7   294.5   124.2 
1982 - 1992 
Mean 63.6 
  
74.1   1,624.2 
  
42.8 
  
1,474.7 
  
96.2 
Std. Dev. 496.3   824.0   1,328.2   135.2   686.3   83.1 
1992 - 2001 
Mean 296.4 
  
-102.0   1,144.0 
  
-13.0 
  
1,338.6 
  
216.8 
Std. Dev. 997.8   1,067.8   1,307.8   154.6   909.0   203.3 
2001 - 2004 
Mean 1,145.1 
  
879.7   1,317.0 
  
-219.9 
  
1,649.9 
  
152.5 
Std. Dev. 486.6   2,418.6   1,579.3   196.7   1,112.9   95.8 
1972 - 2004 
Mean 219.2 
  
119.6   1,400.6 
  
13.1 
  
1,325.9 
  
161.2 
Std. Dev. 685.2   1,053.4   1,194.5   151.8   702.7   141.8 
 
 
 
 
 
Grifell – Tatjé, E. and C.A.K. Lovell (2008), “Productivity at the Post: its Drivers and its Distribution,” Journal of Regulatory 
Economics vol.33, issue 2, April, pp 133 – 158. 
DOI: 10.1007/s11149-007-9051-y 
 29
 
 
 
Table 5. Bennet Quantity Indicator Economic Decomposition  
Mean Results by Period (millions of current dollars) 
Period   
Bennet 
Quantity 
Indicator 
  
Margin 
Effect + 
Productivity 
Effect   
Productivity Effect 
=
  
Cost 
Efficiency + 
Technical 
Change Effect + Scale Effect 
1972 - 1982 
Mean 27.5   -5.6 
  
33.1 
  -39.6   101.1   -28.4 
Std. Dev. 271.5   33.1   291.2   194.4   163.9   189.8 
1982 - 1992 
Mean 63.6   -26.2   89.8   47.6   324.2   -282.0 
Std. Dev. 496.3   24.2   508.0   150.5   368.1   282.1 
1992 - 2001 
Mean 296.4   13.4   282.9   0.0   541.3   -258.3 
Std. Dev. 997.8   22.5   1,008.3   0.0   684.4   656.8 
2001 - 2004 
Mean 1,145.1   10.6 
  
1,134.6 
  0.0   680.1   454.5 
Std. Dev. 486.7   16.4   480.6   0.0   681.8   202.1 
1972 - 2004 
Mean 219.2   -5.2 
  
224.3 
  
2.5 
  
348.9 
  
-127.0 
Std. Dev. 685.2   30.0   689.7   137.0   489.3   442.9 
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1
  Much of the available research on USPS and other postal networks is collected in a 
series of volumes edited by M. A. Crew and P. R. Kleindorfer and listed at 
http://crri.rutgers.edu/pub/   
2
  This Section draws on USPS (2003) and Geddes (2003, 2005). 
3
  The USPS does report nonzero operating profit each fiscal year, and this value has to 
go somewhere. However we are reluctant to refer to the recipients of this operating profit 
or loss, whether they be the Federal Financing Bank or taxpayers, as “residual 
claimants,” in the traditional sense as expressed by Fama and Jensen (1983), because 
their claims are neither enforceable nor transferable (“alienable”). 
4
  A popular analytical framework for public sector service provision is one of budget 
constrained (or break-even constrained) revenue maximization. With frequent reference 
to USPS, Sappington and Sidak (2003) analyze the behavior of a “managerially-oriented 
public enterprise” that seeks to maximize a convex combination of revenue and profit. 
They show that such an organization is less concerned with controlling the cost incurred 
in expanding output(s) than a profit-seeking organization would be, and that such an 
organization has strong incentives to pursue anticompetitive activities. Although our 
focus is on productivity, financial performance and income distribution, and although 
they assign power to management rather than to labor, the predictions of their model are 
not inconsistent with some of the behavior of the USPS. 
5
  The analytical model has a single output, although it easily generalizes to multiple 
outputs, as in Grifell-Tatjé and Lovell (1999). We specify a single output because in its 
internal database the USPS reports a single output quantity index which, when divided 
into operating revenue, yields an implicit output price index. It also reports a mail quantity 
index and a delivery point index, and more detailed decompositions of both, but it is not 
possible to allocate operating revenue to mail quantity and delivery points, and so it is 
not possible to construct corresponding implicit price indexes. 
6
  Just as Fisher indexes are geometric means of Laspeyres and Paasche indexes, 
Bennet indicators are arithmetic means of Laspeyres and Paasche indicators. Diewert 
(2005) has demonstrated that Bennet quantity and price indicators satisfy a large 
number of tests analogous to those satisfied by Fisher quantity and price indexes. 
7
  The quantity effect can be expressed equivalently in growth rather than difference 
form, and decomposed as 
p ytGy - Σ w nxntGxn                                                                                 quantity effect 
= ( pyt - Σ w nxnCEt)Gy                                                                               margin effect 
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+ (Σ w nxnCEt)Gy – (Σ w nxnt)[Σ( w nxnt/Σ w nxnt)Gxn]  productivity effect 
In the margin effect output growth Gy = [(yt+1/yt) – 1] is weighted by the difference 
between total revenue and cost-efficient total cost, using arithmetic mean output and 
input prices. In the productivity effect output growth is weighted by cost-efficient total 
cost, and input growth Σ( w nxnt/Σ w nxnt)Gxn is weighted by actual total cost, with both 
weights using arithmetic mean input prices. The weights convert a conventional 
productivity growth accounting formula Gy – Σ( w nxnt/Σ w nxnt)Gxn expressed in 
percentage terms to one expressed in value terms that shows the cost saving impact of 
productivity gains. 
8
 The productivity effect can be expressed equivalently in growth rather than difference 
terms, and decomposed as 
(Σ w nxnCEt)Gy – (Σ w nxnt)[Σ( w nxnt/Σ w nxnt)Gxn]        productivity effect 
= Σ w nxnCEt[(xnt – xnCEt)/xnCEt] – Σ w nxnCEt+1[(xnt+1 – xnCEt+1)/xnCEt+1]    cost efficiency effect 
+ Σ w nxnE[(xnCEt - xnE)/xnE]                                                      technical change effect 
+ Σ w nxnCEtGy - Σ w nxnE[Σ( w nxnE/Σ w nxnE)((xnCEt+1 - xnE)/xnE)]                         scale effect 
The scale effect is a productivity effect, measured net of cost efficiency change and 
technical change and using cost-efficient input cost shares w nxnE/Σ w nxnE. It is a pure 
scale effect evaluated on the surface of Tt+1, and signals increasing, constant or 
decreasing returns to scale according as Gy ⋛ Σ( w nxnE/Σ w nxnE)Gxn. The weights convert 
a conventional scale economies formula expressed in percentage terms to one 
expressed in value terms that shows the cost saving impact of the exploitation of scale 
economies. 
9
 The productivity effect is interpreted broadly to include the impact of scale economies 
as well as the impacts of technical change and efficiency change. This broad 
interpretation corresponds to the US Bureau of Labor Statistics (2007) definition of 
multifactor productivity change as being “…designed to measure the joint influences on 
economic growth of technical change, efficiency improvements, returns to scale, 
reallocation of resources, and other factors.” Expressions (2) and (4) thus state that profit 
change is attributable to pricing power, a margin effect and productivity change. Apart 
from the margin effect, this is consistent with the interpretations of Miller (1984) and 
others in the accounting literature who attribute profit change to productivity change and 
price recovery change (their terminology for our price effect). Expression (5) converts a 
standard economic paradigm concerning the sources of productivity change, typically 
expressed in percentage terms, into a decomposition expressed in value terms. 
10
  Geddes (1998) examines 1930 – 1996 data in an effort to find structural breaks in 
various USPS indicators at reorganization. We examine 1972 – 2004 data in an effort to 
identify post-reorganization trends in a different set of USPS indicators. The research 
objectives are complementary, and the data are overlapping, and so it is possible, 
perhaps even likely, that some of the trends we uncover are continuations of discrete 
changes brought about by the PRA. 
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11
 The USPS reports total operating expense in its Annual Reports. This figure differs 
from the total cost figure reported in the USPS internal database. For the last five years, 
the two figures are very close. 
    2004          2003          2002          2001          2000         
USPS Annual Report    65851        63902        65234        65640        62992       
USPS Internal Data      66929         65128        66503        66375        64294       
% difference                       1.6             1.9             1.9              1.1             2.1            
In addition, because we do not include the general public service subsidy or the 
foregone revenue appropriation, our operating profit series is lower than what USPS 
reports as net income (loss) in its Annual Reports. 
12
 Tables 2 - 5 report post-reorganization sub-period means and standard deviations. 
Most standard deviations exceed their means by a wide margin, revealing year-to-year 
variability in the underlying data. For example, stamp prices change by discrete 
amounts, and at discrete and irregular intervals, which introduces variability into the 
output price, revenue and profit series. This in turn introduces variability into the 
decompositions reported in Tables 2 – 5.  We emphasize that the source of year-to-year 
variability is the underlying data rather than our manipulations of the data. In addition, 
year-to-year variability causes sub-period results to be sensitive to the specification of 
terminal years. Annual variability needs to be kept in mind when interpreting the results 
of Tables 2 – 5, which are smoothed by averaging. Annual versions of Tables 2-5 are 
available on request. 
13
 It is worth noting, however, that the productivity effect itself is dwarfed by the input 
price effect obtained by adding the capital, labor and materials price effects in Table 4. 
The result has been continuously increasing unit costs that have exerted a drag on the 
bottom line. This finding is in accordance with the USPS “postal inflation index” (defined 
as C/y), which has increased 5.3% annually since reorganization. 
14
 Cohen et al. (2004a) suggest that the delivery function exhibits scale economies, and 
that other functions do not. We do not decompose USPS activities by function. Even 
though the delivery function accounts for approximately one third of total cost, our results 
suggest that aggregate cost-efficient operating cost has varied proportionately with 
aggregate output (which is a convex combination of a mail quantity index and a delivery 
point index). The two essential differences between the two approaches are that Cohen 
et al. define scale economies as the reciprocal of the elasticity of actual cost with respect 
to mail quantity, defined as the number of pieces of mail delivered, whereas we define 
scale economies as the reciprocal of the elasticity of cost-efficient cost with respect to 
what the USPS calls a workload index, defined as a convex combination of a mail 
quantity index and the number of delivery points. Historically growth in the mail quantity 
index has lagged that of the number of pieces of mail delivered, reflecting substitution 
away from high value mail categories into lower value mail categories. Our finding of 
slight decreasing returns to scale is consistent with this substitution, and supports the 
belief of the President’s Commission that the USPS can “grow smaller and stronger.” 
